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Abstract
Perks are a commodity bundle offered by an employer to an employee. They are used to directly
control an employee’s consumption. Consuming certain goods increases the marginal disutility of
non-contractible effort. Lower consumption of such goods will make it less costly to induce an
employee to put in high effort. To compensate for the decrease in such goods, an employer gives
luxurious perks. By “luxurious” I mean that per-dollar marginal utilities of these perks are lower
than those of other goods. This model explains the existence of perks such as box seat tickets and
club memberships, which neither save tax nor enter the production function. Also, perks can be
more luxurious at an unsuccessful outcome than at a successful outcome, and an employee with a
more successful history receives more perks.
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1 Introduction
Why do perks exist? Why not just pay an employee in cash and let the employee purchase
these products? A possible clue lies in the fact that many such perks are products that the
employee seems unlikely to purchase, even if he were given the money. In other words, perks
are usually luxurious. This begs the question: “Why does an employer want her employees
to consume these luxuries?”
I study perks in the framework of the principal-agent model. For simplicity, suppose that
there are three commodities: money (a numeraire good), a condominium, and effort. An
agent puts in effort to produce money. The production process is stochastic, and its outcome
distribution depends on effort. Effort is non-contractible. Therefore, there is a typical moral
hazard problem.
Ex-post efficient allocation equates the per-dollar marginal utility of money to the per-
dollar marginal utility of the quality of the condominium. Assume that the marginal disutility
of effort is invariant to the quality of the condominium, but decreases in the amount of
money.1 Suppose that the employer increases the quality of the condominium above the ex-
post efficient allocation, and correspondingly decreases the cash salary to hold the employee’s
utility level constant. The implementation of higher effort becomes easier due to the lowered
marginal disutility of effort. Thus, the change improves ex-ante efficiency even though ex-
post efficiency is not satisfied. Therefore, an optimal contract would award a condominium
of better quality than what an employee would have chosen, i.e. the condominium is a
luxurious perk. My finding suggest that luxurious perks mitigate agency problems.
1Under the interpretation that effort is reciprocal of leisure, empirical evidence demonstrates the increas-
ing marginal disutility of effort in money. See Grossman and Hart (1983), Browning and Meghir (1991), and
Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) for detailed discussion. The assumption is a simplification that any two
commodities have different effects on the marginal disutility of effort. A generalized model is also presented
in Appendix A.2.
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I also show that perks are more luxurious2 when the moral hazard problem is more severe.
Moreover, perks can be more luxurious at an unsuccessful outcome than at a successful
outcome. The media criticize lavish perks more when a firm is performing badly or is on
the verge of bankruptcy. However, ex-ante efficiency requires such “excessive perks” at an
unsuccessful outcome.
Alternatively, I could interpret money as tomorrow’s consumption, and the condominium
as today’s consumption. In this interpretation, a principal devises an optimal wage scheme
over two periods, and the principal wants the agent to consume more today than tomorrow.3
A dynamic model similar to Rogerson (1985) with a sequence of moral hazard problems
confirms the aforementioned interpretation. I also find that a principal is more likely to
encourage an agent’s current period consumption when the agent’s outside option – to opt out
of the principal-agent relationship – is less favorable. If the principal suppresses the following
period’s consumption too much (by encouraging the current period’s consumption), the agent
might choose to sign up with another principal after the current period’s consumption.
Finally, I find that under a certain condition, the more senior an employee with a successful
history becomes, the more perks he is awarded.
1.1 Comparison with Previous Works on Perks
Some economists argue that perks lead to a moral hazard problem: an employer cannot
monitor whether an employee abuses them or not. In this view, perks are “non-productive
goods.” Other economists, following Alchian and Demsetz (1972), consider perks as a con-
sequence of a moral hazard problem. When the members of a profit-sharing firm have to
purchase input factors personally, there is an under-investment problem (or, equivalently, a
2When the difference between the per-dollar marginal utilities of money and the quality of a condominium
is larger, I say that perks are more luxurious.
3Henderson and Spindler (2005) also rationalize addictive perks in a dynamic setting. However, I do not
assume the addictive property of perks, and give a formal mathematical modeling.
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free-rider problem) since each does not fully appropriate the profit from these investments.
If the problem is severe, it could be efficient to give the input factor as a perk, in spite of
the possible abuse. This second view considers perks as “productive goods.” 4
Both of these views share the idea that the employer cannot observe the usage of perks.
However, many expensive perks can easily be monitored. For example, it is not difficult
to check whether a private jet is used for business or for personal reasons. The cost of
monitoring this will be insignificant compared to the cost of the jet. In fact, it is often a
legal requirement to report such expensive perks to the public. 5 If the use of perks is
observable, it is explicitly contractible. Thus, I consider perks as a contingent payment.6
Instead of devising a universal theory of perks,7 I restrict my interest to this type of perks.
I do not assume that perks provide intrinsic motivation (no consumption complemen-
tarities between perks and effort), nor do I assume perks have a productive use, as in most
of the literature. Those assumptions automatically justify the existence of perks. However,
there are many perks that do not seem to help production or reduce the agent’s cost of
effort. For examples, corporate retreats involving horse back riding in Santa Fe, volleyball in
Bari, or sailing in Greece, may be useful for “team building”, but more frugal destinations
might be equally useful. Other examples include fancy company cars, a “training program”
4Yermack (2006) uses this term for the consumption of non-productive goods and services. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Rajan and Wulf (2006) distinguish productive and non-productive perks. Marinoa and
Za´bojn´ık (2006) mainly consider perks as the consumption of productive goods. Oyer (2007) considers perks
that have complementarities with effort and production.
5For example, new SEC rules since 2006 require public companies to list all perks over $10,000. For top
rankers in receiving perks, see
http : //www.bayareanewsgroup.com/multimedia/mn/biz/specialreport/wtbm ceosorts.pdf
http : //www.bayareanewsgroup.com/multimedia/mn/biz/specialreport/wtbm underceosorts.pdf
6Perks are clearly a part of compensation scheme, and contracts are renewed over time (the agent is
promoted, demoted, or laid-off). Therefore, perks are also renewed. This reflects the repeated contractual
relationship between a principal and an agent.
7Because of the elusiveness of the term, the SEC even refuses to define the term (SEC, 2006, p. 6553).
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on a Mediterranean island, a car service home in a Lincoln town car, and a lavish corporate
holiday party.
I also do not assume that a principal and an agent can save on tax by having perks.
Hypothetically, a principal could report perks as a cost of the production, get a tax deduction,
and thus provide the perks at a lower cost than the agent would pay privately. However,
the tax advantage explanation fails to explain why we do not often see perks in lower paid
jobs. For example, there is typically no commuting subsidy for general office workers, while
executives often receive corporate cars with a chauffeur. Furthermore, many perks are now
fully subject to tax.8
Section 2 builds a static model, and presents the results. Section 3 develops a dynamic
model, and presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Static Model
There are two goods, money (m ∈ R) and a condominium. q ∈ R is the quality of the
condominium. The price of money is unity, and the expenditure on a condominium of
quality q is pq, i.e. the expenditure increases linearly in quality q.9 The principal owns
a technology which produces money. The outcome of the production is stochastic. The
probability of output s ∈ S is denoted by ϕ(s; e), which is a function of effort e ∈ {eH , eL}
chosen by the agent.10 Utility function of the agent is quasi-separable in effort, i.e.
U(m, q; e) := v(m; e) + u(q).
8Since many perks are listed to the public, they could be taxed. For example, Meg Whitman (eBay) was
invited to use corporate planes for up to 200 hours of personal travel annually. That added up to more than
$773,000, plus nearly $231,000 more to cover her tax bills for the perk.
9I assume that the cost of supplying quality is linear; my results are robust to alternative assumptions,
such as a convex cost function.
10The assumption of two effort levels is for the simplicity of analysis. Extension to a continuum support
of effort is straightforward.
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A generalized model without the quasi-separability is presented in Appendix A.2. The utility
function satisfies: u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, v′(m; e) := ∂v(m;e)
∂m
> 0, and v′′(m; e) := ∂
2v(m;e)
∂m2
< 0.
I assume that the marginal disutility of effort, v(m; eL) − v(m; eH), increases in money
unless mentioned otherwise.
Assumption 1 (Income Effect of Money)
v′(m; eH) < v′(m; eL)
On the other hand, the marginal disutility of effort is constant in the quality of the condo-
minium as u(·) does not have argument e.
The principal is risk neutral. The principal’s expected revenue is R(e) :=
∑
s∈S sϕ(s; e).
The principal designs an optimal contract (m(s), q(s))s∈S: m(s) and q(s) are the two goods
awarded at output s. The principal uses the two goods to enforce an optimal effort level of
the agent. The principal’s expected profit is
R(e)−
∑
s∈S
[m(s) + pq(s)]ϕ(s; e).
A contract implementing eL would employ a fixed wage, which is not interesting. Therefore,
I assume that eH is implemented. The typical incentive compatibility constraint and the
participation constraint are
(λ) :
∑
s∈S
[v(m(s); eH) + u(q(s))]ϕ(s; eH) ≥
∑
s∈S
[v(m(s); eL) + u(q(s))]ϕ(s; eL), ∀e′ [IC]
(ρ) :
∑
s∈S
[v(m(s); eH) + u(q(s))]ϕ(s; eH) ≥ 0 [IR]
λ and ρ are the shadow value of the corresponding constraints.
The principal’s problem is:
max
m(s),q(s)
R(eH)−
∑
s∈S
[m(s) + pq(s)]ϕ(s; eH) s.t. [IC] and [IR]
I derive the following main theorem and a lemma.
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Theorem 1
v′(m(s); eH) =
u′(q(s))
p
[
1− λ(v′(m(s); eH)− v′(m(s); eL))ϕ(s; eL)
ϕ(s; eH)
]
(1)
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Lemma 1 ρ > 0 and λ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Note that the monetary value of the agent’s consumption bundle at state s is
M(s) := m(s) + pq(s).
If the agent could have accessed the spot market of the goods, the agent’s ex-post maximiza-
tion would be
max
m˜(s),q˜(s)
[v(m˜(s); e) + u(q˜(s))] subject to M(s) := m˜(s) + pq˜(s).
The first order condition is
v′(m˜(s); e) =
u′(q˜(s))
p
, [SMC]
which I call the spot market constraint, [SMC]. This conditions states that per-dollar marginal
utilities of the two goods are the same.
Notice that Equation (1) in Theorem 1 is not consistent with [SMC] unless λ(v′(m(s); eH)−
v′(m(s); eL))
ϕ(s;eL)
ϕ(s;eH)
is zero. From this observation, I derive a corollary about the relationship
among the moral hazard problem, spot market access, and the income effect.
Corollary 1 [A] Equation (1) is consistent with [SMC] if there is no moral hazard problem.
[B] Without the income effect of money, Equation (1) is consistent with [SMC].
Proof. [A] Substituting λ with zero in Equation (1), I derive [SMC]. [B] From Equation
(1), I derive [SMC] if v′(m(s); eH) = v′(m(s); eL).
The following corollary is trivial.
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Corollary 2 In the presence of the income effect and the moral hazard problem, the profit
to principal when she can use perks is larger than that when she could not use perks.
I establish three observations from Theorem 1.
Firstly, a principal implements an allocation such that per-dollar marginal utilities of the
two commodities are different. (Or, equivalently, the marginal rate of substitution is not the
same as the price ratio.) More specifically, u
′(q(s))
p
< v′(m(s); eH). The deviation from [SMC]
is measured by
λ [v′(m(s); eH)− v′(m(s); eL)] ϕ(s; eL)
ϕ(s; eH)
.
For any s, the principal is giving too little m(s) (equivalently, too much q(s)) to equate per-
dollar marginal utilities of money and the quality of the condominium. This means that the
condominium is luxurious: the agent would not have purchased (or rented) the condominium
of the same quality, if he were given money with the right to access the spot market. By
lowering the consumption of money, the principal can lower the marginal disutility of effort;
It is cheaper to control the incentive problem of the agent with the lowered marginal dis-
uitility, than with higher marginal disutility. In other words, the principal wants to give
a better condominium (equivalently, less money) for ex-ante efficiency (implementation of
higher effort with cheaper expected cost), rather than to equalize per-dollar marginal utilities
of the two goods for ex-post efficiency (v′(m(s); eH) =
u′(q(s))
p
).
Secondly, suppose v(m; e) = U(m)− kme− C(e), and that the functional form satisfies
the typical second order conditions. Then ∆ev
′(m) := v′(m; eH)−v′(m; eL) is constant in m.
For s and s′ such that ϕ(s;eL)
ϕ(s;eH)
> ϕ(s
′;eL)
ϕ(s′;eH)
, λ∆ev
′(m(s)) ϕ(s;eL)
ϕ(s;eH)
> λ∆ev
′(m(s′)) ϕ(s
′;eL)
ϕ(s′;eH)
. Notice
that s seems more likely to have come from effort eL than s
′ does. This means that the
deviation from v′(m(s); eH) =
u′(q(s))
p
would be larger at an unsuccessful outcome than at a
successful outcome. Media criticize lavish perks more when a firm is performing badly or on
the verge of bankruptcy. However, my model rationalizes excessive perks at an unsuccessful
outcome for ex-ante efficiency.
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Lastly, the deviation is larger for larger λ. More severe moral hazard problem implies
more perks.
3 Dynamic Model
I interpret money and a condominium in the previous section as tomorrow’s and today’s
consumption. Under this interpretation, Assumption 1 means that the marginal disutility of
effort increases in tomorrow’s consumption, so that a principal wants to encourage today’s
consumption over tomorrow’s. A two period model following Rogerson (1985) confirms this
interpretation under certain conditions. Then I develop a three period model to see how
perks evolve over time.
3.1 Two Periods Model
Time frame is as follows.
Period 1 : The agent chooses e1, state s1 is realized, and consumption q1(s1) is awarded to
the agent.
Period 2 : The agent chooses e2(s1), state s2 is realized, and consumption q2(s1, s2) is
awarded.
Note that a principal can implement different effort in period 2, e2(s1), depending on s1.
Also the principal can commit to the schedule e2(s1). In addition, the principal can design
a wage schedule to be a function of s1 even for q2. These two characteristics of the contract
could further relax the incentive compatibility constraint even when s1 and s2 are known to
be independent.
For a given realization (s1, s2), the utility function for the agent is
u(q1(s1); e1) + βv(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2(s1)).
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Note that there is income effect from consumption q1(·) and q2(·) to effort e1, and consump-
tion q2(·) to effort e2. 11
ϕ(s1; e1) is the probability that s1 is realized for given effort e1. I allow correlation
between s1 and s2; φ(s1, s2; e1, e2) is the probability that (s1, s2) is realized for given (e1, e2).
Therefore, the probability that s2 is realized for given s1 and (e1, e2) is ψ(s2; s1, e1, e2) :=
φ(s1,s2;e1,e2)
ϕ(s1;e1)
.
For given effort schedule (e1, e2(s1)), the ex-ante utility is∑
s1
u(q1(s1); e1)ϕ(s1; e1) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1))
I also assume that eH is implemented in period 1. Without that assumption, the princi-
pal’s problem is to solve separate optimization problems for each realized s1 with e1 = eL,
which is not interesting.
11 The formulation of utility function here puts e1 in function v to reflect that q2 influences the marginal
disutility of e1. Alternatively, I could put q2 into function u(·) to reflect the same. However, those two ways
of formulating utility function are not much different. For example, suppose there is linear adverse effect of
consumption to effort. Then the followings two set-ups are identical.
u(q1, q2; e1) := U(q1)− ku1 q1e1 − kv1q2e1 − c(e1), v(q2; e2) := U(q2)− kv2q2e2 − c(e2)
u(q1; e1) := U(q1)− ku1 q1e1 − c(e1), v(q2; e1, e2) := U(q2)−
kv1
β
q2e1 − kv2q2e2 − c(e2)
where ku1 (k
v
1 or k
v
2) measures the adverse effect of consumption in period 1 (period 2) to the effort in period
1 (period 1 or 2). Also discount factor β is added for the second formulation. The formulation here could
be called consumption separable utility representation, while u(q1, q2; e1) and v(q2; e2) could be called effort
separable utility representation.
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The agent could not commit to a sequence (e1, e2(s1)). There are two incentive compat-
ibility constraints for period 1 and 2. 12∑
s1
u(q1(s1); eH)ϕ(s1; eH) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); eH , e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1))
≥
∑
s1
u(q1(s1); eL)ϕ(s1; eL) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); eL, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eL, e2(s1)) [IC1]
β
∑
s2
v(q2(s1, s2); eH , e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1))
≥ β
∑
s2
v(q2(s1, s2); eH , e
′
2)φ(s1, s2; eH , e
′
2) for all s1, e
′
2 [IC2(s1)]
Note that I added β, and used unconditional probability (φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1))) instead of
conditional probability (φ(s1,s2;e1=eH ,e2(s1))
ϕ(s1;e1=eH)
) for [IC2(s1)]. These are for the simplicity of later
notations. Also note that the deviation for [IC1] is only with respect to eL since e2(s1) is
implemented by [IC2(s1)], and the agent cannot commit to e
′
2 in period 1.
An agent can dissolve the principal agent relationship at any period to receive the outside
option of value 0. There are two participation constraints for each of period 1 and 2.∑
s1
u(q1(s1); eH)ϕ(s1; eH) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); eH , e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1)) ≥ 0 [IR1]
β
∑
s2
v(q2(s1, s2); eH , e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1)) ≥ 0 [IR2(s1)]
Note that I again used unconditional probability for [IR2(s1)], and added β.
Let r to be interest rate between period 1 and period 2. The revenue to the principal at
state (s1, s2) is R1(s1) +
1
1+r
R2(s1, s2), where the revenue in period 2 potentially depends on
12 The agent might think of the following deviation scheme that is not captured by the two incentive
compatibility constraints: the agent deviates to effort e′1 influencing v(q2(s1, s2); ·, e2(s1)), then deviates to
e′2. However, the effort e
′
1 is sunken in period 1. Therefore, e
′
1 should not affect the decision in period 2. In
other words, even though v(·) has argument of e1, the effort in period 1 influence only the ex-ante utility in
period 1 through v(·), but not the expected utility in period 2. If I employ the alternative utility formulation
in the previous footnote to incorporate income effect, the point is clearer.
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state s1. The expected revenue is
R(e1, e2(s1)) :=
∑
s1
R1(s1)ϕ(s1; e1) +
1
1 + r
∑
s1,s2
R2(s1, s2)φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1))
The ex-post cost of the principal is q1(s1) +
1
1+r
q2(s1, s2). Therefore, the expected cost is∑
s1
q1(s1)ϕ(s1; e1) +
1
1 + r
∑
s1,s2
q2(s1, s2)φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1)).
The price of the good is normalized to be unity.
In sum, the principal’s maximization problem for given effort schedule (eH , e2(s1)) is
max
q1(·),q2(·)
R(eH , e2(s1))−
[∑
s1
q1(s1)ϕ(s1; eH) +
1
1 + r
∑
s1,s2
q2(s1, s2)φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1))
]
s.t. [IC1], [IC2(s1)], [IR1], [IR2(s1)]
Let the shadow value of the constraints be λ1, λ2(s1), ρ1, and ρ2(s1). Also let
E
[
1
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1] = ∑
s2
1
v′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e2(s1))
ψ(s2; s1, eH , e2(s1)),
E
[
v′(q2(s1, ·); eL, e2(s1))
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1; eL, e2(s1)] = ∑
s2
v′(q2(s1, s2); eL, e2(s1))
v′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e2(s1))
ψ(s2; s1, eL, e2(s1)),
E
[
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e′2)
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1; eH , e′2] = ∑
s2
v′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e′2)
v′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e2(s1))
ψ(s2; s1, eH , e
′
2)
I derive my second theorem.
Theorem 2
1
β(1 + r)
E
[
1
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1]
=
1
u′(q1(s1); eH)
+ ρ2(s1) + λ2(s1)
(
1− E
[
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e′2)
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1; eH , e′2])
+ λ1
(
u′(q1(s1); eL)
u′(q1(s1); eH)
− E
[
v′(q2(s1, ·); eL, e2(s1))
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1; eL, e2(s1)]) ϕ(s1; eL)ϕ (2)
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Proof. See Appendix A.4
For simple analysis of Equation (2), I assume the following.13
Assumption 2
β =
1
1 + r
, u(q; e1) = A(q)− ku1 qe1 − c(e1), v(q; e1, e2) = A(q)−
kv1
β
qe1 − kv2qe2 − c(e2)
ku1 measures the income effect of q1 to e1, and k
v
1 and k
v
2 measure the income effect of q2 to
e1 and e2. I derive the following from Theorem 2.
Corollary 3 With Assumption 2,
E
[
1
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1] < 1u′(q1(s1); eH)
⇔ ρ2(s1)u′(q1(s1); eH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
−λ2(s1)kv2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+λ1
(
ku1 −
kv1
β
)
ϕ(s1; eL)
ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
< 0 (3)
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Term (i) comes from the participation constraint in period 2 at state s1, term (ii) comes
from the incentive compatibility constraint in period 2 at state s1, and term (iii) comes from
the incentive compatibility constraint in period 1. Terms (ii) and (iii) are also dependent
on the income effect.
Without an income effect and the participation constraint in period 2, the following holds
from Theorem 2. (Rogerson (1985) showed it first.)
1
u′(q1(s1); eH)
= E
[
1
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1] . [BE(s1)]
By Jensen’s Inequality,
1
u′(q1(s1); eH)
= E
[
1
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))
∣∣∣∣ s1] > 1E[v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))|s1]
⇒ u′(q1(s1); eH) < E[v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))|s1]. (∗)
13However, note that I could give almost identical interpretation without Assumption 2.
13
The intuition is that an agent wants to save resource in the first period (equivalently, to
increase resource in the second period) to decrease the variation of the utilities in the second
period.14 Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint alone shows that the marginal
utility in the first period must be smaller than the expected marginal utility in the second
period. However, that is not always true with the participation constraint in period 2. For
example, suppose that there is no income effect (i.e. ku1 = k
v
1 = k
v
2 = 0), but there is partici-
pation constraint in period 1. Then, E[1/v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))|s1] = 1/u′(q1(s1); eH)+ρ2(s1)
from Theorem 2. For large ρ2(s1) > 0, I cannot derive the result of (∗) in general.
Corollary 3 does not answer exactly when E[v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e2(s1))|s1] > u′(q1(s1); eH)
holds, i.e. when the principal encourages the consumption in period 1. However, it suggests
that if the right-hand side of (3) is not a large positive number, it is more likely that the
principal will want to encourage the consumption in period 1. The remaining analyses
interpret Corollary 3 as such.
I interpret small ρ2(s1) to represent the difficulty for the agent to opt out of a Principal-
Agent relationship. For example, if a principal has the entire monopoly power over the
employment of an agent, there would be no participation constraint. That is equivalent to
ρ2(s1) = 0. Corollary 3 suggests that there would be more perks for the employees in thin
labor market than for those in thick labor market.
Suppose that the shadow value of the moral hazard problem is large and/or the income
effect kv2 is large. Term (ii) indicates that Inequality (∗) is likely to hold when e2(s1) = eH .
On the other hand, if e2(s1) = eL, it is cheaper for the principal to give full insurance to the
agent to have binding participation constraint in period 2 at state s1. In other words, the
existence of perks is an evidence of the implementation of high effort.
Suppose that β-multiplied adverse effect of the future consumption on current effort is
smaller than that of the next immediate future consumption (βku1 < k
v
1). Then term (iii) is
always negative. Therefore, the principal is likely to encourage the consumption in period
14Because the utility function is concave, the utility variation decreases if the agent saves.
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1. On the other hand, if βku1 > k
v
1 , the magnitude of λ1 and
ϕ(s1;eL)
ϕ(s1;eH)
matters. The more
likely state s1 seems to have come from effort eL (large
ϕ(s1;eL)
ϕ(s1;eH)
), the less likely the principal
encourages the consumption in period 1. Intuitively, the principal has motive to punish the
agent at such state, so that she cannot encourage the consumption in period 1 too much. The
more severe the moral hazard problem in period 1 is (larger λ1), the heavier the punishment
would be. Thus, the principal is less likely to encourage the consumption in period 1.
3.2 Three Periods Model
I analyze how the encouragement of consumption evolves over time in this section. A three
period model is enough to see the intution. The time frame is as follows.
Period 1 : The agent chooses e1, state s1 is realized, and consumption q1(s1) is awarded.
Period 2 : The agent chooses e2, state s2 is realized, and consumption q2(s1, s2) is awarded.
Period 3 : The agent chooses e3, state s3 is realized, and consumption q3(s1, s2, s3) is
awarded.
For given realization (s1, s2, s3), the utility for the agent is
u(q1(s1); e1) + βv(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2) + β
2w(q3(s1, s2, s3); e1, e2, e3).
ϕ(s1; e1) is the probability that s1 is realized for given effort e1. φ(s1, s2; e1, e2) is the prob-
ability that (s1, s2) is realized for given (e1, e2). χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3) is the probability that
(s1, s2, s3) is realized for given (e1, e2, e3).
Then the ex-ante utility, incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints
in period 1, 2, and 3, expected revenue, and expected cost are similarly defined. Details are
in Appendix A.6
Let the shadow value of the incentive compatibility constraints and the participation
constraints to be λ1, λ2(s1), λ3(s1, s2), ρ1, ρ2(s1), and ρ3(s1, s2). To save space, let w
′ :=
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w′(q3(s1, s2, s3); eH , e2(s1), e3(s1, s2)). Also let
E
[
1
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2] = ∑
s3
1
w′
χ(s1, s2, s3; eH , e2(s1), e3(s1, s2))
φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1))
,
E
[
w′(q3(·); eL, ·, ·)
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2; eL]
=
∑
s3
w′(q3(s1, s2, s3); eL, e2(s1), e3(s1, s2))
w′
χ(s1, s2, s3; eL, e2(s1), e3(s1, s2))
φ(s1, s2; eL, e2(s1))
,
E
[
w′(q3(·); ·, e′2, ·)
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2; e′2]
=
∑
s3
w′(q3(s1, s2, s3); eH , e′2, e3(s1, s2))
w′
χ(s1, s2, s3; eH , e
′
2, e3(s1, s2))
φ(s1, s2; eH , e′2)
,
E
[
w′(q3(·); ·, ·, e′3)
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2; e′3]
=
∑
s3
w′(q3(s1, s2, s3); eH , e2(s1), e′3)
w′
χ(s1, s2, s3; eH , e2(s1), e
′
3)
φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1))
.
(eH , e2(s1), e3(s1, s2)) is the effort schedule chosen by the principal as in the last section.
The Principal-Agent problem can be similarly formulated, and I get the following result.
Theorem 3
1
β(1 + r)
E
[
1
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2; eH , e2(s1), e3(s1, s2)]
=
1
v′
+ ρ3(s1, s2)β(1 + r) + λ3(s1, s2)β(1 + r)
[
1− E
[
w′(q3(·); ·, ·, e′3)
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2; e′3]]
+ λ1β(1 + r)
[
v′(q2(s1, s2); eL, e2(s1))
v′
− E
[
w′(q3(·); eL, ·, ·)
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2; eL]] φ(s1, e3; eL, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1))
+ λ2(s1)β(1 + r)
[
v′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e′2)
v′
− E
[
w′(q3(·); ·, e′2, ·)
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2; e′2]] φ(s1, e3; eH , e′2)φ(s1, s2; eH , e2(s1))
Note that the qualitative difference of the equation from Equation (2) is an extra shadow
value, λ1 from two periods past. Similarly to Corollary 3, I derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4 Under Assumption 2 and
w(q; e1, e2, e3) = A(q)− k
w
1
β2
qe1 − k
w
2
β
qe2 − kw3 qe3 − c(e3),
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Identity (3) and the following identity are derived.
E
[
1
w′
∣∣∣∣ s1, s2] < 1v′ ⇔ ρ3(s1, s2)v′ − λ3(s1, s2)kw3
+ λ1
[
kv1
β
− k
w
1
β2
]
φ(s1, s2; eL, e2(s1))
φ
+ λ2(s1)
[
kv2 −
kw2
β
]
φ(s1, s2; eH , e
′
2)
φ
< 0
Under the assumption of βkv1 < k
w
1 and βk
v
2 < k
w
2 , the accumulated shadow value makes the
right hand side of the equation more likely to be smaller than 0.
This property of accumulated shadow value is present in N -periods model too. If N -
periods model were formulated, there are t− 1 accumulated shadow value in the inequality
between periods t and t − 1. t could be interpreted as seniority. But, just because one is
more senior, it does not mean that more perks are provided; the multipliers (λ1, λ2(s1),
. . . , λt−1(s1, . . . , st−1)) have to be positive for the accumulation to be meaningful. For the
multiplier at a period to be positive, the implemented effort must be eH at the period. In
other words, a principal gives more perks to the agent who had more success in the past
with high effort implemented. A senior staff in a firm could be understood as such an agent.
4 Conclusion
I have shown that (i) a principal can use perks to mitigate the moral hazard problem, (ii)
perks are luxurious, (iii) perks are more luxurious when the moral hazard problem is more
severe, and (iv) perks can be more luxurious at an unsuccessful outcome than at a successful
outcome under a certain condition.
The principal uses perks to encourage the consumption of the goods that do not increase
the marginal disutility of effort. Therefore, it becomes cheaper to implement a higher effort
since the marginal disutility of effort is lowered. It is possible to interpret perks as en-
couragement of current consumption over future consumption. A dynamic model confirms
this interpretation. Under certain conditions, the encouragement of the current period’s
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consumption is more likely when the labor market is thin and/or when an employee is a
senior.
Perks are not the only contractual agreement that could increase the consumption of
commodities that do not increase the marginal disutility of effort. For example, (partially)
reimbursing expenditure on personal use of company facilities , or offering company discounts
are other ways to encourage such consumption.
It is well known that exclusiveness of contract is required for the efficient solution of the
moral hazard problem: an agent is prohibited to privately access insurance (or contingent
claims) markets. (See Fisher [1992], Tommasi and Weinschelbaum [2004], and Park [2004])
Exclusiveness clauses in insurance policies and the prohibition of insider trading also can
be explained by these motives. However, the effect of restriction in private access to spot
market has not been studied. My work suggests that the restrictions over access to spot
markets may improve efficiency in other environments.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To save space, I use the following notational conventions.
v′ := v′(m(s); eH), u′ := u′(q(s)), ϕ := ϕ(s; eH).
The FOCs are
−ϕ+ λ[v′ϕ− v′(m(s); eL)ϕ(s; eL)] + ρv′ϕ = 0,−pϕ+ λ[u′ϕ− u′ϕ(s; eL)] + ρu′ϕ = 0
which are equivalent to
1
v′
= ρ+ λ
[
1− v
′(m(s); eL)
v′
ϕ(s; eL)
ϕ
]
,
p
u′
= ρ+ λ
[
1− ϕ(s; eL)
ϕ
]
(4)
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Combining them, I get the following.
p/u′
1/v′
=
ρ+ λ
(
1− ϕ(s;eL)ϕ
)
ρ+ λ
(
1− v′(m(s);eL)v′ ϕ(s;eL)ϕ
)
=
ρ+ λ
(
1− v′(m(s);eL)v′ ϕ(s;eL)ϕ
)
− λ
(
1− v′(m(s);eL)v′
)
ϕ(s;eL)
ϕ
ρ+ λ
(
1− v′(m(s);eL)v′ ϕ(s;eL)ϕ
)
=
1
v′ − λ
(
1− v′(m(s);eL)v′
)
ϕ(s;eL)
ϕ
1
v′
⇒ pv′ = u′
[
1− λ(v′ − v′(m(s); eL))ϕ(s; eL)
ϕ
]
by Equation (4).
Therefore, the main theorem is proved.
A.2 Generalized Static Model
Let the utility function of the agent to be u(m, q; e). The two first order conditions are
−ϕ+ λ (um · ϕ− um(m, q; eL) · ϕ(s; eL)) + ρumϕ = 0
−pϕ+ λ (uq · ϕ− uq(m, q; eL) · ϕ(s; eL)) + ρuqϕ = 0
They change into
1
um
= ρ+ λ
(
1− um(m, q; eL)ϕ(s; eL)
umϕ
)
,
p
uq
= ρ+ λ
(
1− uq(m, q; eL)ϕ(s; eL)
uqϕ
)
Combining them, I get the following resembling Theorem 1.
p · um = uq
[
1 + λum
ϕ(s; eL)
ϕ
(
um(m, q; eL)
um
− uq(m, q; eL)
uq
)]
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Note the following equation.
p
u′
= ρ+ λ
[
1− ϕ(s; eL)
ϕ
]
.
Suppose ρ = 0. Then, p/u′ is negative when ϕ(s;eL)ϕ > 1. Contradiction. Hence, ρ > 0. Suppose λ = 0, then
p/u′ and 1/v′ are constant in s from Equation (4). Therefore, q(s) and m(s) are constant. Contradiction.
Hence, λ > 0.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
The first order conditions are:
−ϕ+ λ1 [u′ϕ− u′(q1(s1); eL)ϕ(s1; eL)] + ρ1u′ϕ = 0,
− 1
1 + r
φ+ βλ1 [v′φ− v′(q2(s1, s2); eL, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eL, e2(s1))]
+βλ2(s1) [v′φ− v′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e′2)φ(s1, s2; eH , e′2)] + βρ1v′φ+ βρ2(s1)v′φ = 0
which are
1
u′
= ρ1 + λ1
[
1− u
′(q1(s1); eL)ϕ(s1; eL)
u′ϕ
]
, (5)
1
β(1 + r)v′
= ρ1 + ρ2(s1) + λ1
[
1− v
′(q2(s1, s2); eL, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eL, e2(s1))
v′φ
]
+λ2(s1)
[
1− v
′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e′2)φ(s1, s2; eH , e
′
2)
v′φ
]
Combining them, I get
1
β(1 + r)v′
=
1
u′
+ ρ2(s1) + λ2(s1)
[
1− v
′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e′2)φ(s1, s2; eH , e
′
2)
v′φ
]
− λ1
[
v′(q2(s1, s2); eL, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; eL, e2(s1))
v′φ
− u
′(q1(s1); eL)ϕ(s1; eL)
u′ϕ
]
by using (5).
That is
⇔ 1
β(1 + r)v′
φ
ϕ
=
1
u′
φ
ϕ
+ ρ2(s1)
φ
ϕ
+ λ2(s1)
[
1− v
′(q2(s1, s2); eH , e′2)φ(s1, e3; eH , e
′
2)
v′φ
]
φ
ϕ
− λ1
[
v′(q2(s1, s2); eL, e2(s1))
v′
φ(s1, s2; eL, e2(s1))
ϕ
− u
′(q1(s1); eL)ϕ(s1; eL)
u′ϕ
φ
ϕ
]
Summing the previous equation over s2, I get,
1
β(1 + r)
E
[
1
v′
∣∣∣∣ s1; eH , e2(s1)] = 1u′ + ρ2(s1) + λ2(s1)
(
1−E
[
v′(q2(s1, ·); eH , e′2)
v′
∣∣∣∣ s1; eH , e′2])
− λ1
[
E
[
v′(q2(s1, ·); eL, e2(s1))
v′
∣∣∣∣ s1; eL, e2(s1)]− u′(q1(s1); eL)u′
]
ϕ(s1; eL)
ϕ
Rearranging, I derive the theorem.
A.5 Proof for Corollary 3
From the below,
u(q; e1) = A(q)− ku1 qe1 − c(e1), v(q; e1, e2) = A(q)− kv1qe1 − kv2qe2 − c(e2),
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I derive
E
[
1
v′
∣∣∣∣ s1] = 1u′ + ρ2(s1)− λ2(s1)kv2E
[
1
v′
∣∣∣∣ s1]+ λ1(ku1 1u′ − kv1β E
[
1
v′
∣∣∣∣ s1]) ϕ(s1; eL)ϕ
By rearranging the equation, I get the result.
A.6 Three Periods Model
The ex-ante utility function is∑
s1
u(q1(s1); e1)ϕ(s1; e1) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2)φ(s1, s2; e1, e2)
+β2
∑
s1,s2,s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e3)χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
I have three incentive compatibility constraints.∑
s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e3)
χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
φ(s1, s2; e1, e2)
≥
∑
s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e′3)
χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e′3)
φ(s1, s2; e1, e2)
for all s1, s2, e′3 [IC3(s1, s2)]
∑
s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2(s1))
φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1))
ϕ(s1; e1)
+ β
∑
s2,s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e3)
χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
ϕ(s1; e1)
≥
∑
s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e1, e′2)
φ(s1, s2; e1, e′2)
ϕ(s1; e1)
+ β
∑
s2,s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e′2, e3)
χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e′2, e3)
ϕ(s1; e1)
for all s1, e′2 [IC2(s1)]∑
s1
u(q1(s1); e1)ϕ(s1; e1) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1))
+ β2
∑
s1,s2,s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e3)χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
≥
∑
s1
u(q1(s1); e′1)ϕ(s1; e
′
1) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e′1, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; e
′
1, e2(s1)) for all e
′
1
+ β2
∑
s1,s2,s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e′1, e2, e3)χ(s1, s2, s3; e
′
1, e2, e3) [IC1]
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Similarly, I have three participation constraints.∑
s1
u(q1(s1); e1)ϕ(s1; e1) + β
∑
s1,s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2(s1))φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1))
+ β2
∑
s1,s2,s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e3)χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3) ≥ 0 [IR1]
∑
s2
v(q2(s1, s2); e1, e2(s1))
φ(s1, s2; e1, e2(s1))
ϕ(s1; e1)
+ β
∑
s2,s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e3)
χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
ϕ(s1; e1)
≥ 0 [IR2(s1)]
∑
s3
w(q3(s1, s2, s2); e1, e2, e3)
χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
φ(s1, s2; e1, e2)
≥ 0 [IR1]
The expected revenue is
R(e1, e2, e3) :=
∑
s1
R1(s1)ϕ(s1; e1) +
1
1 + r
∑
s1,s2
R2(s1, s2)φ(s1, s2; e1, e2)
+
1
(1 + r)2
∑
s1,s2,s3
R3(s1, s2, s3)χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
The expected cost is∑
s1
q1(s1)ϕ(s1; e1) +
1
1 + r
∑
s1,s2
q2(s1, s2)φ(s1, s2; e1, e2) +
1
(1 + r)2
∑
s1,s2,s3
q3(s1, s2, s3)χ(s1, s2, s3; e1, e2, e3)
By deriving the first order conditions of the principal’s problem, and by arranging by a similar way as in
Appendix A.4, I could get the result.
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